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2. Revenue assignments in the practice 
of fiscal decentralization1
Jorge Martinez-Vazquez
1 INTRODUCTION
Over the past two decades there has been an unprecedented move toward 
decentralized governance all over the world. These changes have taken 
special significance in many developing and transitional countries where 
centralized systems were perceived to have failed to deliver improved 
general welfare. The promise o f political, administrative and fiscal decen­
tralization is that it can strengthen democratic representative institutions, 
increase the overall efficiency o f the public sector and lead to improved 
social and economic welfare for countries that decide to adopt it.
O ne critical assum ption in expecting these benefits is that decentral­
ized governm ents will generally be m ore accountable and responsive 
to  citizens' needs and  preferences than  centralized governm ents were 
in the past. A t the same time, there is general agreem ent am ong experts 
in decentralization that the increased accountability associated with 
decentralization can only be assured when sub-national governm ents 
have an adequate level o f  autonom y and discretion in raising their own 
revenues.
Thus, if effective fiscal decentralization requires meaningful revenue 
autonom y at the regional and local levels o f government, the question is, 
which taxes should be allocated at these levels? This is known in the fiscal 
decentralization literature as the ‘tax assignment problem ’.2 In a chapter 
like this, which is strictly focused on revenue assignments, it is im portant to 
make clear that revenue assignment is just one element in the design o f 
the entire system o f government decentralization and that if revenue au ton­
omy is to work effectively to increase accountability it has to be within 
the context o f  o ther well-designed institutions in a decentralized system. 
D ecentralization involves more than what are traditionally thought o f  as 
fiscal decentralization issues (revenue assignments, the assignments of 
expenditure functions, transfers, and so on); and what is thought o f as 
political decentralization, with democratically elected officials; and what is
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thought o f as administrative decentralization -  in particular in what per­
tains to civil service issues. All are im portant in assuring good outcomes 
from decentralization.
A com m on mistake in some countries recently involved in decentraliza­
tion reform has been to ignore the ‘completeness’ o f decentralized systems 
and to have focused on some form o f revenue decentralization alone (e.g., 
central government revenue-sharing with local governments). The conse­
quences have been not only the failure to capture the benefits o f  decen­
tralization, but also central government deficits and macroeconomic 
instability.3 The well-known dictum  that ‘finance should follow function’ 
reflects the wisdom that revenue assignm ents should come after the assign­
ment o f expenditure responsibilities has been completed.4 The main goal 
o f  this chapter is to provide a policy overview and update on the problem 
o f revenue assignments, an aspect o f  fiscal decentralization design with 
which developing countries, and also many developed countries, continue 
to  struggle. The organization o f  the chapter is as follows. Section 2 reviews 
the perspectives that can be taken on the nature o f revenue assignments. 
Section 3 examines what we want from revenue assignments. Section 4 
reviews different forms o f  revenue autonom y, while Section 5 lists the fun­
dam ental principles o f tax assignment. Section 6 studies the different tax 
instrum ents that are available for assignment at the sub-national level. 
Section 7 briefly reviews the international experience with tax assignments, 
with a special focus on new developments for the feasibility o f  sub-national 
VATs. Section 8 summarizes and concludes.
2 PERSPECTIVES ON REVENUE ASSIGNMENTS
The theory and practice o f  revenue assignments asks two fundam ental 
questions:5 1) W hat taxes should be assigned to different levels o f  govern­
ment? 2) How should these arrangem ents be implemented? These two ques­
tions are typically examined from a norm ative perspective using efficiency 
and equity criteria, as we also do in m ost o f this chapter. However, it can 
be insightful to study revenue assignments from a political economy per­
spective, an approach taken much less frequently. This approach can be 
helpful in addressing several im portant puzzles in the practice o f  revenue 
assignments, for which the commonly used normative criteria o f  equity and 
efficiency offer little or no help.
The first puzzle is that it is com m on to observe in the practice o f  fiscal 
federalism significant deviations from what would be acceptable or recom­
mended under the norm ative criteria. Often in the literature these devi­
ations are brushed aside as being the product o f  ‘the dead hand o f  history’.
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However, in many cases what needs to be explained is not so much why 
certain revenue assignments came into being, since historical factors and 
circumstance can no doubt play a role, but why are wrong (inefficient, 
inequitable and so on) assignments so difficult to reform?6 Part of the 
answer has to be in the unequal bargaining position sub-national govern­
ments have with respect to central powers. The counter example o f  the 
weak central powers in the history o f federalism in N orth  America is a case 
in point. But, this is a question that still remains to be studied fully in the 
literature. A second puzzle in revenue assignments is not so much in the 
design but in the actual implementation. Very often the revenue authority 
provided to  sub-national governments in the law goes unused, while at the 
same time these sub-national governments cry out for m ore funding from 
their central government. A political economy perspective can also be of 
help here. Revenue assignment is just one mode of financing sub-national 
governments and when the incentives are right, it is to  be expected that 
these governments will prefer to be financed by transfers from the central 
government as opposed to asking their residents directly to  contribute to 
the refunds. In the absence of a hard budget constraint and adequate 
revenue autonomy, many behave in a fiscally irresponsible manner, asking 
for ever-increasing national transfers, perhaps under the erroneous collec­
tive belief that residents o f o ther sub-national governments will foot the 
bill. Systems where sub-national governments can count on ever-increasing 
revenue-sharing and other transfers from the central government become 
just another m anifestation o f  the well-known problem o f the ‘tragedy of 
the com m ons’.
However, as we will see below in this chapter, the  theory o f public 
finance provides helpful guidelines on the assignm ent problem , but these 
guidelines are far from being determ inistic and in some cases the guide­
lines can conflict w ith each other. Thus, it should not be surprising to  find 
significant diversity in the actual im plem entation o f revenue assignments; 
it is well accepted that there is no unique o r ‘one-size-fits-all’ tax 
assignm ent. For better o r worse, the history and institutions o f particu­
lar countries also m atter significantly. So, in practice, the choice of 
assignm ents has to  do  as much with politics as with econom ic principles. 
In addition, we should expect the 'preferred ' tax assignm ents to  change 
over time with changes in the economy, for example in response to  glob­
alization, as well as with changes in what we could call the available ‘tech­
nology’ o f  tax assignm ent. For example, until recently, sub-national 
VATs had been considered unfeasible, but this position has changed as 
the result o f  several intellectual innovations, to be discussed later in the 
chapter.
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3 WHAT DO WE WANT FROM REVENUE 
ASSIGNMENTS?
The m ost fundam ental purpose o f  revenue assignments is to get adequate 
levels o f financing so that sub-national governments can implement 
the functions that have been assigned to  them. However, this requirement 
does not offer much o f a guide for revenue assignments because adequate 
financing levels can be obtained from many different tax assignments or 
even w ithout them through intergovernmental transfers.
The more critical requirement for revenue assignments is to provide 
revenue autonom y as the means o f  enhancing political accountability 
am ong sub-national officials. There are several other benefits from revenue 
autonomy. When all financing o f sub-national governments is from revenue- 
sharing and other forms o f  transfers from higher-level governments, there 
is a danger that sub-national governments will become spending agents of 
the center becoming less interested and  efficient,7 and that imposing a hard 
budget constraint on sub-national governments becomes more difficult.8
Sub-national tax autonom y is the best way, if not the only way, to  address 
in a perm anent way the difficult problem of vertical imbalances, o r m is­
match o f expenditure needs and revenue sources at different government 
levels. Adequate revenue autonom y is also a key indicator o f sub-national 
governm ents’ borrowing capacity and creditworthiness. There is also some 
evidence that more revenue autonom y at the sub-national level is associated 
with greater m acroeconomic stability.9
On the other hand, greater tax autonom y can lead, depending on the 
geographical distribution o f  economic activity and tax bases, to larger ho r­
izontal fiscal disparities across sub-national governments. Richer jurisdic­
tions can have the ability to  finance their expenditure needs with little effort, 
while poorer com m unities may have to  exert much greater tax effort with 
their residents to provide for their expenditure needs. However, these hori­
zontal fiscal disputes can be addressed quite well through the proper design 
o f  equalization grants.
If we agree that tax autonom y is param ount, then we need to ask: how 
much tax autonom y is needed? Shouldn’t sub-national governments be 
asked to  finance themselves entirely from autonom ous tax sources? The 
answer is that full own-financing by all sub-national governments is gener­
ally not feasible o r even desirable. The generally accepted rule is that sub­
national governments need to  raise their own funds at the m argin and 
operate with hard budget constraints, which means that revenue-sharing 
and grants should represent only infra-m arginal funding.10
In reality we tend to observe low levels o f tax autonomy. One reason, dis­
cussed in the previous sections, involves simple political economic forces.
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Central governments may not want to devolve taxing powers for fear o f  
com peting with local governments for the same taxing base and at the same 
time sub-national governments do not want to  take on the responsibility o f 
making politically unpopular taxing decisions to meet their budget needs. 
Using intergovernmental transfers is seen as a much easier path for all 
concerned.
Insufficient revenue autonom y can also be the result o f  the lack of adm in­
istrative capacity in some sub-national governments. When low capacity is 
combined with the desire to  provide all sub-national governments (regard­
less o f size and capacity) with the same autonom ous taxing powers, low 
levels o f  tax autonom y can follow. This situation poses a dilemma in decen­
tralization design. A uniform intergovernmental fiscal system under which 
all sub-national governments must operate has an im portant appeal. If all 
sub-national governments have the same expenditure responsibilities and 
revenue-raising powers, management o f the system and evaluation of its 
success are made easier. Uniform treatment o f  all sub-national governments 
also seems generally fairer. On the other hand, a more effective route for 
effective decentralization may be the adoption o f an asymmetric tax assign­
ment providing more tax autonom y to larger sub-national governments 
with m ore capacity and according to transparent objective criteria and let 
the smaller ones ‘grow into this role’ over tim e.11
A lthough decentralized systems in some developed countries have high 
levels o f  tax autonomy, in reality it is quite rare, especially am ong develop­
ing countries to find significant taxing powers devolved to  sub-national 
governments at the onset o f  decentralization. Often, there is considerable 
reluctance from central government to let go o f part o f its authority and 
control over taxes, which in turn is justified because of the need to facilitate 
attainm ent o f proper capacity at the sub-national level. However, these 
stum bling blocks generally linger for many years o f a decentralization 
program , with the side effect o f  a culture o f  dependency taking hold where 
sub-national governments have become accustomed to  relying on central 
transfers for their financing needs.
Regardless o f actual practice, it is undeniable that a goal for revenue 
assignments in all countries remains granting sub-national governments a 
high level o f  tax autonomy. However, the general principle o f providing 
sufficient tax autonom y at the margin is not easily operationalized. In p ar­
ticular, what is the specific meaning o f  ‘sufficient tax autonom y at the 
margin’? Here are some difficulties. Expenditure needs (and their changes) 
are very often hard to  quantify properly. In addition, tax autonom y leads 
to horizontal fiscal disparities giving rise to  the need for equalization 
grants. But then the question becomes how much are central governments 
willing and able to equalize?
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A lthough there are no certain answers, it is possible to  provide some 
guidance to policy makers responsible for the design of revenue assign­
ments. First, quite obviously there is a need to devise some sensible way to 
measure the expenditure needs o f  sub-national governments and to keep 
these measurements reasonably updated. Next, the golden rule for revenue 
assignment should be that these assignments should be sufficient to  fund 
the expenditure needs (net o f conditional grants) o f  the wealthiest sub­
national governments. Sometimes, however, it may be advisable to break 
this rule somewhat and to  have even the wealthiest sub-national govern­
m ents partly financed by central transfers. This may be because o f  vertical 
externalities in the use o f tax bases, economies o f  scale in the adm inistra­
tion o f  some taxes, the need to m aintain the integrity (harm onized nature) 
o f  some taxes, and other considerations in tax adm inistration, which are 
discussed below.
4 IMPLEMENTING REVENUE ASSIGNMENTS: 
WHAT FORM OF TAX AUTONOMY?
If  we accept that tax autonom y for sub-national governments is the 
requirement in revenue assignments, then we need to address two questions: 
1) W hat type o f  revenue autonom y is desirable? 2) W hat kind o f tax instru­
m ents should be used to provide this autonom y? With respect to  the form 
o f tax autonom y, four dimensions have been identified in the literature.12 
The first is which level o f government has the right to choose the taxes that 
this given level can impose. There are good reasons to limit the ability of 
sub-national governments, for example to  introduce internal tariffs, as done 
with the interstate constitutional clause in the United States. Provided that 
these general restrictions are to be in place, there is a choice between an 
open list o f taxes to be determ ined by the sub-national governments within 
general limits and restrictions, o r instead a closed list o f allowable taxes 
determ ined at the national level from which sub-national governm ents can 
choose. There is no clear choice between these two approaches as there are 
advantages and disadvantages associated with each. Overall, a closed list o f 
sub-national taxes is preferable because it avoids the introduction o f nui­
sance taxes in some cases o r higher and inefficient distortionary taxes that 
can easily impede local economic development and grow th.13 But, a closed 
list may not be needed if, for example, all tax bases are nationally legislated 
and harm onized. However, this alternative may be interpreted as just 
another version of a closed-list choice. In the international experience, 
where sub-national governments are given more constitutional discre­
tion, as in the case o f some federal systems, open lists with some general
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restrictions are common. Closed lists are used more frequently in unitary 
systems o f government.
W hether an open-list or closed-list approach is adopted, an additional 
decision needs to be made as to whether the base of specific taxes should 
be used exclusively by one level o f  government or whether these bases 
can be used simultaneously by several levels o f government. The latter 
approach has the disadvantage o f introducing vertical tax externalities due 
to the fact that one level will not typically take into account the impact its 
policies may have on the tax base and revenues o f the o ther level of 
governm ent.14
Several corrective policies can be implemented to correct for this type of 
externality, including separating tax bases for all levels o f government pro­
viding intergovernm ental grants o r increasing the num ber o f sub-national 
governments.15 In practice, when an open-list approach is chosen it is gen­
erally the case that the cohabitation o f bases is allowed. In contrast, it is 
often the case that a closed-list approach is used to eliminate the possibil­
ity o f the cohabitation o f  tax bases. Sometimes the country C onstitution, 
even in the case o f some federal countries, is used to delineate clearly what 
taxes can be used at different levels o f  government (for example, this is the 
case in India, Pakistan or Switzerland). The exclusionary approach to  the 
use o f  tax bases has led in some countries to  cumbersome tax structures. 
For example, in India and Pakistan the federal governments can tax ser­
vices but only the sub-national government can tax goods. These were 
choices made many years back and today they significantly complicate the 
ability to  have functional VATs in those countries.
In practice, the choice between exclusive or shared tax bases comes down 
to weighing the advantages and disadvantages associated with each choice. 
As we just discussed, the main disadvantage of cohabitation is vertical exter­
nalities. The most im portant disadvantage o f  using the exclusive basis is 
that, typically, sub-national governments will be shut out o f any opportun­
ity to  use significant (either in size or elastic over time) tax bases, thus dras­
tically reducing any meaningful possibility o f  sub-national tax autonomy. 
The imposition o f exclusive tax bases can also lead to cumbersome tax 
structures, as in the mentioned cases of India and Pakistan. All things con­
sidered, it appears that a choice of a closed list allowing for the cohabitation 
of tax bases by different levels o f government and using intergovernmental 
transfers to correct for vertical externalities may be the preferred approach.
The second dimension o f tax autonom y relates to which level o f govern­
ment can legislate over the structure o f the tax bases and which level has dis­
cretion to  set the tax rates. O f the two types of autonomy for structuring 
sub-national taxes, autonom y to define the tax base is generally less desir­
able than autonom y to set tax rates.16 Variations in the definition of the tax
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base, either through especial exclusions from tax, deductions from the tax 
base and credits against the tax liabilities can more easily lead to  complex­
ity and lack o f harm onization across jurisdictions.
The most im portant unwanted consequence o f  the lack o f harm oniza­
tion and complexity is the higher tax adm inistration cost for all the juris­
dictions involved and higher compliance costs for taxpayers who have tax 
obligations in several jurisdictions. On the other hand, autonom y to  define 
the tax rate generally tends to be more desirable because it is simpler to deal 
with across jurisdictions for both tax adm inistrators and taxpayers. 
Focusing on autonom y in a tax rate setting has the additional im portant 
advantage o f being perceived to  generate political accountability.
It is often also argued that tax rate setting autonom y may be preferred 
because it has a more direct im pact on revenues and spending ability of sub­
national jurisdictions, because it has a more transparent impact on loca­
tional decisions and fiscal com petition: both households and businesses 
have an easier time figuring out the fiscal exchange or net benefits provided 
by different jurisdictions in their tax-public-service packages when the 
differences in tax burdens are expressed in term s o f differences in tax rates.
The third and last dimension o f revenue autonom y refers to which level 
o f government is put in charge o f  adm inistering the various taxes. This 
dimension o f sub-national tax autonom y is often overlooked and  in some 
cases is summarily dismissed as being o f no consequence. In this latter per­
spective, centralized tax adm inistration is always more efficient and the dis­
cussions about decentralizing tax adm inistration are mostly about tu rf and 
patronage issues (who can hire workers, and so on). However, there are 
some potentially im portant issues here. First, adm inistration by sub­
national governments o f their own taxes is likely to  enhance accountability 
at the sub-national level if taxpayers are more aware o f sub-national taxes 
under this arrangem ent. But second, sub-national tax adm inistration is 
likely to be less cost effective because o f economies o f  scale. Thus, a useful 
way to  approach this decision is to  identify a trade-off between more 
efficient adm inistration, which generally increases with m ore centralized 
adm inistration, and enhanced accountability at the sub-national level, 
which generally increases with m ore decentralized adm inistration. This 
efficiency-accountability trade-off is likely to differ for different taxes. For 
example, the efficiency gains from the centralized adm inistration o f sub­
national piggyback personal income taxes may dom inate any increase in 
accountability generated by decentralized adm inistration o f  those taxes. In 
contrast, there may be no significant efficiency gains in the centralized 
adm inistration o f sub-national property taxes by com parison to the losses 
in local accountability implied by the centralization o f  the adm inistration 
o f these taxes. The adm inistration o f  sub-national taxes or even shared
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taxes by the central adm inistration can present a problem with low incen­
tives even for shared taxes when the central adm inistration’s share in the 
revenues is relatively small. What this means is that when cost advantages 
make it desirable to  centralize the adm inistration, there will be a need for 
setting incentive-compatible arrangem ents between levels o f government 
for the collection o f taxes.17
There is one cost issue we need to  discuss briefly before we leave the 
issue o f  the m ost desirable form o f tax autonom y. It is sometimes argued 
that certain  forms o f  tax revenue-sharing on a derivation basis can con­
tribute to  the revenue autonom y o f sub-national governments. The m ore 
generally accepted view is that tax-sharing is no t a form o f revenue assign­
ment because sub-national governm ents do no t have a direct role in the 
structure and  adm inistration o f  the tax; in this view, revenue-sharing 
should be considered just another form  o f transfers. In the m inority view, 
shared taxes may be considered a form o f tax assignm ent when the shared 
rates are stable over a period o f several years and especially when the 
sub-national authorities can influence the level o f  adm inistration and 
affect the size o f  the tax bases. For these reasons, it is custom ary in many 
transitional countries, especially those in the former Soviet U nion, to  
consider shared taxes as part o f  the own revenues o f  sub-national 
governm ents.18
There are some other cases that appear just to be another form o f tax- 
sharing but in reality are special cases of tax assignment. For example, cur­
rently in Spain some im portant taxes have been partially ceded to regional 
governments. For example, 33 per cent of the personal income tax belongs 
to the regional governments, but this is not a usual form o f revenue-sharing. 
The Spanish law divides the tax schedule for the personal income tax into 
a central government schedule and a regional government schedule. In 
general, these forms o f revenue assignment tend to be less transparent, and 
even if they yield equivalent levels o f tax autonomy, they are less likely to 
produce the same level o f accountability in comparison to an arrangem ent 
with separate tax assignments to each level o f government with the regional 
governments granted several forms o f  discretion over their share.19
5 WHAT KIND OF TAX INSTRUMENTS ARE BEST 
SUITED FOR SUB-NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS?
The principles of tax assignment or criteria that should guide the assign­
ment o f  revenue sources across different government levels in a country 
reflect the dual role o f  taxes. First, taxes simply provide the means to 
finance the provision o f  public goods and services, but taxes are also used
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as an instrum ent to  achieve government policy objectives, such as the redis­
tribution o f  income through progressive taxation.
The classic starting  point for the principles o f tax assignm ents is 
M usgrave’s (1959) seminal work, where he argued that the  economic 
objectives for governm ent are fundam entally threefold: assuring a stable 
econom ic environm ent, in which the m arket is able to function; achieving 
a m ore equitable d istribution o f income; and  assuring a m ore efficient 
allocation o f  resources in case the m arket fails. While, generally, the 
knowledge o f  circum stances o f  tim e and  place make decentralized m arket 
forces superior to  a centralized allocation o f  economic resources, there 
are a num ber o f  areas where the m arket fails because o f  cost advan­
tages as in the case o f  natural m onopolies, the impossibility o f exclu­
sion in consum ption, as in the case o f  public goods, o r  the presence o f 
externalities.
Musgrave’s (1959) ‘three roles’ for government activities can be used to 
guide the assignment o f revenue sources across different government levels. 
After all, different tax instrum ents have varying impacts with respect to the 
three functions o f the public sector: macroeconomic stabilization, redistri­
bution o f income and resource allocation. Further characteristics can be 
identified that make certain taxes more appropriate for assignment at the 
sub-national level o f  government. Although there continues to  be some con­
troversy on this, the general consensus am ong public finance economists is 
to agree with Musgrave that policy decisions on economic stabilization 
and income distribution are best assigned to the central government,20 
while some o f those related to allocative efficiency (how best to use the 
resources available to provide goods and services) may be assigned to local 
governments.
Beyond the guidance provided by Musgrave’s governmental roles, there 
are some characteristics o f taxes that are commonly acknowledged as desir­
able regardless o f w hether these taxes are to  be assigned at the central o r 
sub-national levels. These include:
1. revenue buoyancy, meaning that overall, revenues should change 
roughly in proportion to  the economic base;
2. equity, meaning that good revenue sources are ‘fair’ or equitable in the 
sense o f horizontal equity under which taxpayers in similar circum ­
stances should be treated similarly and vertical equity under which tax­
payers with different incomes should pay according to  their ‘ability to 
pay’;
3. efficiency, meaning that the tax should have relatively low adm inistra­
tion and compliance costs and create a minimum o f distortion in the 
economy; and
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4. political acceptance, meaning that taxes need to be sensitive to the his­
torical and institutional framework in a country.
There are, in addition, several other principles that are desirable for taxes 
that are to  be assigned at the sub-national level.21 First, the benefit princi­
ple, which relates revenue sources to the benefits being provided, should be 
implemented to the largest extent possible. Second, sub-national revenue 
sources should have a tax base that is relatively evenly distributed across 
jurisdictions. This helps to  minimize fiscal disparities am ong sub-national 
governments and reduces the burden put on equalization grants to allow a 
more uniform quantity  and quality o f services. Third, sub-national tax 
sources should have immobile bases to minimize the likelihood o f tax com ­
petition am ong jurisdictions in a ‘race to the bottom ’. However, not all tax 
com petition is undesirable; a moderate tax competition gives an incentive 
to politicians and bureaucrats to be efficient and to provide services accord­
ing to  citizens’ preferences in their choice o f taxes. Fourth, sub-national 
taxes should be geographically neutral in the sense that they do not inter­
fere with domestic or international commerce, they do not distort the loca­
tion o f economic activity across the national territory and they are not 
exported such that the taxes levied by a sub-national government are pri­
marily borne by residents in other jurisdictions. Fifth is a requirement for 
administrative feasibility so that sub-national taxes can be implemented 
w ithout undue costs o f compliance and adm inistration. C ertain taxes may 
be better administered at the local level because of inform ation advantages 
(e.g., property taxes), while for the same reasons local governments have a 
relative disadvantage in collecting other taxes (e.g., personal income tax). 
Sixth, sub-national grants should exhibit generally stable tax bases; revenue 
sources that are highly sensitive to general economic conditions (e.g., profit 
taxes) should be assigned to the central government, which has greater 
ability to  deal with cyclical fluctuations in revenues through borrowing and 
other means. Seventh, sub-national taxes should be highly visible so that 
tax burdens are clearly perceived by local residents. O f course, sub-national 
governments are likely to  think quite differently about this. Finally, sub­
national tax assignments need to be stable over time. A typical problem of 
transitional countries has been unstable assignments, with the assignments 
not being established in perm anent laws but instead decided in annual 
budgets. Ad hoc assignm ents decided on an annual basis may also result in 
a lack o f uniformity, unnecessary complexity and perverse incentives 
toward revenue mobilization.
One thing sub-national taxes do not need to  do is to  attem pt to redistrib­
ute income through progressive rate structures. This is not only because, 
as Musgrave (1959) indicated, income redistribution is a governmental
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function best performed at the central level, but also because the elimina­
tion o f  some taxes due to their assumed regressivity may do more harm than 
good, as for example, in recent years in Sub-Saharan Africa. In these coun­
tries, sub-national taxes that are revenue-producing and provide a m ean­
ingful degree o f autonom y have been eliminated or there have been calls for 
their elimination because they are regressive; that is, these taxes may require 
lower-income taxpayers to pay a greater percentage o f their income in tax 
than upper-income taxpayers. However, the elimination o f  these revenue 
sources typically implies a reduction o f local services, which may hurt the 
poor more because they do not have the possibility of using alternative 
private services. The elimination o f those tax sources also reduces political 
accountability at the local level. For example, although user fees are gener­
ally regressive, residents regardless o f  income would be better off in a com ­
munity with safe public water sources funded by user fees when compared 
with a community where no safe drinking water is available, and all house­
holds have to rely on more expensive private provision o f  potable water. 
Nonetheless, often the regressivity o f  local taxes can be mitigated by provi­
sions for relief o f  hardship and other measures to protect those with the 
lowest incomes.
6 SELECTING TAX INSTRUMENTS FOR 
ASSIGNMENT AT THE SUB-NATIONAL LEVEL
There are hardly any taxes that comply with all desirable criteria listed 
above. A compromise across criteria is generally needed. But, even though 
we cannot select one single best assignment, it is clear that the criteria allow 
us to  select am ong better and worse tax assignments.
In practice naturally, there are disagreements on what should be in the 
minimum list o f  requirem ents for tax assignment at the sub-national level. 
One such minimum list would include revenue autonom y at the margin, 
stable assignments over time, sufficient revenues for the wealthiest sub­
national government units and for taxes to  be based as much as possible on 
the benefit principle and on less mobile tax bases. But it must be clear that 
the minimum list using the benefit principle where feasible is the single most 
im portant. As Bird (2000) and others have argued, sub-national govern­
m ents are mostly prescribed to  engage in activities ensuring a more efficient 
allocation o f public resources, and therefore they should be assigned 
revenue sources for which it is easier to establish a link with the benefits 
received by residents from local government spending. The most obvious 
example o f a revenue source satisfying this benefit principle is charging for 
specific services provided by local governments (for example, the cost o f
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issuing driver’s licenses) and for goods and services provided by public 
enterprises (utility charges, museum admission and so on). Besides gener­
ating revenue for local governments, user charges also provide information 
on dem and to public sector officials.
However, often it is no t feasible to  use charges for a variety o f services 
provided by sub-national governments. In these cases it may be feasible to 
use ‘benefit taxes’, o r com pulsory contributions to local governments that 
are nonetheless related in some m anner to  benefits received by the tax­
payer. For example, the size or value o f a residential property may be seen 
as relating to  an individual taxpayer’s benefits received from improvements 
on the street where the property is located. Relating taxes to  the benefits o f 
public spending has the m ajor advantage o f  helping increase the account­
ability o f  sub-national governments to  their own constituencies. The 
effectiveness o f benefit taxes in increasing political accountability and 
fiscal responsibility is enhanced with the mobility o f  taxpayers across 
jurisdictions.
6.1 Better Choices of Sub-national Taxes
A lthough it is not possible to  come up with an exact list o f  taxes that must 
be assigned to sub-national governments, it is quite possible to  draft a list 
o f taxes that would make good choices for this task:
6.1.1 Fees and user charges
The m ost straightforward way to raise revenue in accordance with the 
benefit principle is by charging user fees to  cover the cost o f  providing 
specific local government services. As remarked above, besides generating 
revenue for local governments, user charges are able to  function as a pricing 
mechanism, thereby ensuring that locally provided goods are only used by 
local residents as long as their benefits exceed the cost to the user. One 
feature o f  this source o f sub-national revenues is that revenues raised from 
user fees and other non-tax revenue sources are generally not available for 
general-purpose funding o f local services or infrastructure.
One general argum ent that is sometimes made against the reliance on 
user fees a t the local government level is that user fees are potentially regres­
sive. However, as we have already com m ented, one needs to be careful not 
to overstate the im portance o f the redistributional role o f sub-national 
governments. In some sense, considering the regressivity o f  user charges 
does not make much m ore sense than considering, for example, the regres­
sivity o f  food expenses. As noted earlier, equity and distributional issues are 
much better addressed at other levels in the overall fiscal system of the 
country.
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To the extent that the main purpose o f  ‘real’ licenses and user fees is to 
recover the adm inistrative costs o f  issuing the licenses or the cost o f pro­
viding the public services, it is im portant to price the service right. 
Requiring sub-national governments to  set the fee levels below the actual 
cost o f provision imposes an unfunded m andate and it can easily lead to 
poor provision o f services.
While user fees provide im portant efficiency benefits, it is im portant to 
balance the cost o f collecting and adm inistering user fees with the am ount 
o f revenues collected; certain types o f  user fees involving many small trans­
actions may be too costly to  collect. It can make good sense to  bundle the 
collection o f  a variety o f  fees into a single payment. For example, it is pos­
sible to collect refuse collection fees or street lighting fees as a surcharge on 
property taxes.
6.1.2 Property taxes and betterment levies
There is ample consensus in the public finance literature identifying the 
property tax as one o f  the best mainstays at the sub-national level. 
Something else makes the property tax particular in the revenue assign­
ments problem. Almost w ithout exception, revenues from the property tax 
are assigned to  local governments as opposed to intermediate-level or 
regional governments. The degree o f discretion given to  local governments 
to m anipulate the tax may vary but the thinking that this tax belongs to 
local governments seems well entrenched.22
Several features make property taxes especially attractive as a sub­
national tax. M ost im portan t, the property tax is a visible tax and thus 
conducive to  political accountability. In addition, the tax, for the m ost 
part, falls on an unmovable base. The m ore homogeneous both  the p rop­
erty and population, the closer the property tax comes to being a benefit 
tax.23 However, depending on how the property tax is structured, it can 
move away from the benefit link. For example, this may be the case if the 
tax burden falls on just a few classes o f  property, such as non-residential 
property.
O ther advantages o f  property taxes are their revenue potential and sta ­
bility. N ote also that from a vertical equity viewpoint, the property  tax can 
be progressive in developing countries, and therefore can increase the 
overall vertical equity o f  the tax system, although in practice it can be 
made regressive by exem ption policies that target w ealthier households.24 
The property  tax also has the desirable feature that much o f the tax 
burden is quite likely borne by residents in the jurisdiction where the ser­
vices financed by property taxes are provided. The property  tax also has 
the advantage that it im poses a relatively low com pliance cost on taxpay­
ers because taxpayer intervention in term s o f the determ ination o f  tax
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liability is minimal, except in the case o f  appeals. Typically the property 
tax poses no significant problem o f tax base com petition with the central 
governm ent, basically because this is not a tax that central governm ents 
tend to  covet.25 Finally, a part o f property tax might be thought o f  as a 
charge for land that can  lead to  significant improvements in the quality o f 
land use.
The main drawback o f  the property tax is that, perhaps due to its visi­
bility it is likely to be unpopular with taxpayers and, as a result, also with 
public officials. O ther drawbacks include the fact that it can lead to liquid­
ity problems for homeowners with valuable real estate assets but low 
incomes.26 In addition, the property tax adm inistration requires costly 
revaluation o f property on a regular basis, and it is difficult to enforce, 
because the confiscation o f property may be considered too extreme 
because o f  the political fallout. Finally, the property tax lacks revenue elas­
ticity, meaning that the tax typically exhibits little autom atic revenue 
growth.
In practice there are several forms o f  the property tax. For example, some 
countries separate the taxation o f land and improvements, or structures, 
and a few others tax only land values or rents. Although a tax on land tends 
to be m ore efficient, it also has less revenue potential and it is generally 
more difficult to  adm inister properly, for example, in terms o f  valuation or 
assessment o f properties. There is another type of property tax in the form 
of 'betterm ent levies’ or lump-sum payments exacted upfront by sub­
national governments from land and housing developers and also from 
homeowners as a charge for public service improvements, such as road 
paving, drain infrastructure, sidewalks, street lights and so on, which all 
have a visible benefit on property values. Betterment levies can be useful in 
providing sub-national governments with liquidity to invest in needed 
infrastructure; they also have the advantage o f being more directly con­
tractual than property taxes and therefore reinforcing the benefit principle 
feature in sub-national government financing.
There are different modalities for the adm inistration o f  the tax, includ­
ing centralized or central oversight over cadastres and re-evaluation 
processes, which can make this type o f  tax even feasible in developing coun­
tries. N ote that tax autonom y is largely preserved as long as sub-national 
authorities are given some discretion over rate setting.27
6.1.3 Vehicle and transportation taxes
These are generally attractive sub-national taxes because o f the strong link 
between the ownership o f vehicles on the one hand, and the use o f local 
services and infrastructure (particularly roads) on the other. In addition, 
sub-national taxes and charges on vehicles can counteract the negative
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externalities associated with local traffic congestion and air pollution in the 
local area. This is also a tax that tends to have elastic revenues. It is perhaps 
for this reason that the central governments in some developing countries, 
wrongly, tend to  assign these taxes to  themselves. There are, o f  course, some 
transportation taxes such as in the case o f air travel, which are rightly allo­
cated at the central level, since air traffic control and other similar services 
should be centrally provided.
6.1.4 Natural resource taxes (when resources are evenly distributed)
There is at least a partial link between taxes on natural resource extraction 
and the benefit principle at the local level. N atural resource taxes can be 
justified at the local level to  the extent that extraction activities use local 
infrastructure (e.g., roads needed to  transport heavy machinery and mined 
resources), place stress on other local infrastructure (tem porary worker 
camps, hospital facilities required to  treat injuries incurred by those working 
in this industry and so on), and -  depending on the type o f extraction -  may 
pollute the environment o r cause other negative externalities, increasing 
health costs o f  local residents. There has been growing interest in the fiscal 
decentralization literature in the pros and cons o f the assignment of natural 
resource revenues to sub-national governments.28 N otwithstanding the 
arguments for some form of local taxation o f natural resources, there are 
two m ajor arguments against it. First, in the case of geographically con­
centrated natural resources, local taxation could cause extensive horizontal 
fiscal imbalances (e.g., the recent cases o f Indonesia, Nigeria and Russia). 
These fiscal disparities can lead to  inefficient population migration and loca­
tion o f  business. Second, given the high volatility o f world commodity 
prices, local taxation o f natural resources would not constitute a stable 
source o f  revenue.
Therefore, some balance m ust be reached, especially in the case o f the 
uneven geographical distribution o f resources, between first, centralized 
taxation o f  natural resources to address disparities and avoid or correct for 
negative economic externalities, and second, sharing some o f  the revenues 
with sub-national governm ents to  com pensate for the environmental 
damage o f  the extraction process and so on.
6.1.5 Local business taxes
Certain forms of business taxes or business license fees are justified at the 
sub-national level as an indirect but administratively easier way to tax 
income o f business owners (especially non-wage incomes), and as a benefit 
tax for the services and infrastructure provided by sub-national governments.
Where it is not feasible to recoup costs o f  local government services 
through user charges, some form o f broad-based levy on general business
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activity is warranted. However, to avoid economic distortions, the broad- 
based levy should be neutral to the factor mix, applying equally to labor 
(payroll) and capital (assets) used by businesses. Such a tax, which is some­
times called a business value tax (BVT) is discussed by Bird (2003). The base 
of the BVT would resemble that o f the VAT although the two taxes func­
tion quite differently. In contrast to  the destination-based VAT, the BVT 
would be origin-based, therefore taxing exports (not imports) because the 
benefits from sub-national governments’ services acrue at the place o f  pro­
duction (not consumption). In addition, while the typical VAT is calculated 
by the subtraction m ethod on transactions (gross receipts minus the cost o f 
intermediate goods and services), a BVT would be calculated by adding 
payroll, interest, rents and net profits on the basis of annual accounts.
The closest example o f  a BVT in practice was Italy’s regional business 
tax (known as the IRA P) prior to the elimination o f payroll from the tax 
base in 2003.29 A potential disadvantage o f a BVT is that it requires good 
levels o f  accounting and record-keeping and quite advanced tax adm inis­
tration capacity. These requirements make it less of an option for taxing 
small business and for use in countries where tax adm inistration is not 
sophisticated. A nother feature that may help explain its lack o f popularity 
is its overlap in terms o f  the tax base with value-added taxes, and therefore 
the hard political sell for this tax. An alternative to business taxation at the 
sub-national level is to  use charges that may vary by type, size or location 
o f the business. For example, Kenya has used this form o f a tax, called the 
single business perm it, since 1999.
6.1.6 Excise taxes (subject to area size and cross-border trade and 
smuggling limitations)
Subject to the area size, cross-border trade and smuggling limitations, 
excise taxes have potential as piggyback taxes or special taxes at the sub­
national level. Excises tend to be more politically acceptable, can be easily 
administered in coordination with national wholesalers as withholding 
agents and allow for rates differentiated by region. For example, some 
O EC D  countries allow sub-national government surcharges on excises.30 
Moreover, the benefit principle accords well with the assignment of 
(destination-based) excises on alcohol and tobacco to the sub-national level 
(to the extent that the latter is responsible for health care) and on vehicles 
and fuel (to the extent o f  sub-national government involvement in road 
construction and m aintenance). The ability to charge differential rates 
across sub-national jurisdictions is, of course, limited by the possibility of 
cross-border trade and smuggling. The extent to which excise piggyback 
surtaxes can be used at the local level depends also on the technology of 
product distribution and points o f  sales.
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An interesting aspect o f excise taxation at the sub-national level is the 
taxation o f  public utility services. There is significant revenue potential in 
some o f these services, as in the case o f  electricity and phone services. 
Besides revenue potential and adm inistrative ease, sub-national excises on 
public utility services are attractive because o f the benefit principle. For 
example, excises on electric consum ption and phone services should be in 
m ost cases good proxies for the dem and o f local public services by both 
households and enterprises. Com pared with other commodities, taxation 
o f public utilities would be associated with relatively low distortions, as 
m ost utilities show relatively low price-elasticity o f dem and. Also, the 
dem and for public utilities has been shown to be income elastic, which 
brings two additional benefits to this form o f sub-national taxes: progres- 
sivity and revenue buoyancy (Linn, 1983).
6.1.7 Flat-rate piggyback income taxes
As we have discussed above, progressive income taxes are best assigned at 
the central government level, because income redistribution should be an 
objective pursued by the central governments because o f the mobility o f 
taxpayers and so on. A nother reason for this assignment is tha t progressive 
income taxes tend to  act as autom atic economic stabilizers and  macroeco­
nomic stabilization should primarily be a function of the central govern­
ment. Nevertheless, there are several possibilities for the taxation of 
personal income by sub-national governments. The most commonly used 
form o f sub-national income taxation internationally is a flat-rate income 
tax as a surtax or ‘piggyback’ tax on the central government personal 
income tax. This type o f tax is alm ost always collected by the central gov­
ernm ent adm inistration and shared on a derivation basis.31 To enhance 
revenue autonomy, local governm ents may be allowed discretion in setting 
the flat rate between m inim um  and maximum rates, which are centrally leg­
islated.32 A flat-rate local piggyback income tax easily satisfies the benefit 
principle and, being quite visible, it prom otes political responsibility and 
accountability at the sub-national level. This is also an elastic tax with rev­
enues increasing com m ensurate with income, so that as the dem and for 
local services increases with income, so do tax revenues.
6.2 Worse Choices for Sub-national Taxes
As we have discussed, the principles o f  tax assignment do not provide a 
deterministic list o f taxes, but those principles are helpful in identifying more 
good choices, and also likely poor choices. First, progressive personal income 
taxes are not a good choice for tax assignment at the sub-national level; ulti­
mately, it would seem to make little sense to have income redistribution only
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within the boundaries o f sub-national jurisdictions, since richer taxpayers 
tend to live in richer jurisdictions. In addition, the mobility of high-income 
taxpayers and businesses could easily lead to distortion in the location of 
economic activity.
A nother tax that is ill-equipped for application at the sub-national level 
is the corporate income tax or profit tax. This is a tax more appropriately 
assigned to  the central government level because of its link to macroeco­
nomic stabilization and, to the extent that corporations are owned by 
wealthy individuals, this tax also affects income redistribution. Perhaps 
even m ore relevant, is that even when levied by the central government, the 
corporate income tax hardly meets sounds principles. There are no reasons 
to believe that incorporated businesses benefit more from public services 
than unincorporated ones or that the benefits received vary with profits. 
The main justification for a corporate income tax is to prevent avoidance 
of individual income tax through incorporation and to withhold tax on 
foreign shareholders, who otherwise only may have to pay tax in their coun­
tries o f residence. Clearly, it is administratively easier to tax profits at source 
rather than  as individual income after distribution am ong shareholders.
A t a more practical level, the assignment o f profit taxes at the central level 
is justified by the difficulty o f apportioning well the profits o f enterprises 
across sub-national jurisdictions where they operate. Some countries that 
have corporate income taxes at the sub-national level attem pt to  apportion 
the nationwide profits o f enterprises am ong sub-national jurisdictions using 
a formula. These apportionm ent formulas generally use a weighted index of 
combinations o f  three factors: payroll, assets and sales. But, despite these 
formulas, the allocation o f profits across jurisdictions tends to  be quite arbi­
trary because o f  the imprecise link between the location o f those factors and 
the generation of profits. In countries where no formula is used, the typical 
norm  is to  share the revenues between the central and sub-national govern­
ments on a derivation basis, that is, according to  the jurisdiction where the 
taxes have been actually collected. This practice leads to  an arbitrary distri­
bution o f  revenues, since the shared revenues stay in the very few jurisdic­
tions where companies are registered or have their headquarters. This means 
that the capital o f the country and a few other large cities where enterprises 
have their headquarters tend to benefit unfairly vis-a-vis jurisdictions where 
the enterprises have factories and other forms o f economic activity that use 
local resources and public services.
A nother tax that traditionally has been thought a poor choice for assign­
ment to  the sub-national level is the VAT. The main difficulty lies in the fact 
that the debiting and crediting of the VAT is likely to take place in different 
sub-national jurisdictions, which generally will imply an arbitrary appor­
tionm ent o f VAT revenues across those jurisdictions.33 This also makes it
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problematic to share VAT revenues with sub-national governments on a 
derivation basis. However, it is perfectly feasible to share VAT revenues with 
sub-national units using a formula. For example, the VAT can be shared on 
the basis o f population (as in Germ any and Belarus), or on the basis of 
the regional shares in aggregate consum ption (as in C anada’s Maritime 
Provinces, Japan or Spain).34 But, o f course, this form o f revenue-sharing 
does little to  enhance revenue autonom y or accountability among sub­
national governments. Nevertheless, in more recent years, there have been a 
series of developments in practice and at theoretical levels that clearly 
dem onstrate that sub-national VATs on a destination basis using the invoice- 
credit method are quite feasible. We review those developments next.
6.3 The Feasibility of Sub-national VATs
Broad-based indirect taxes are attractive to  sub-national governments 
because o f their revenue potential. A lthough retail final sales taxes are still 
used in some countries, for example at the state level in the United States, 
the current consensus is that a destination-based VAT is preferable to  a 
retail sales tax as a sub-national tax option especially when a national VAT 
already exists (which, o f  course, is not the case in the United States).35
However, the introduction o f sub-national VATs is am ong the most 
complex issues in the theory and  practice of revenue assignments. Basically, 
only three large federal countries have introduced sub-national VATs: 
Brazil, C anada and India. The mixed experience from these countries has 
served for many years as an example o f the difficulties facing any other 
country contem plating the introduction o f a sub-national VAT. The best 
experience so far is, no doubt, the Quebec Sales Tax (QST). This tax is 
structured as a deferred-paym ent plus destination-based system and in 
com bination with C anada’s federal G ST (goods and services tax) consti­
tutes a truly operational ‘dual VAT’.36 On the other hand, Brazil’s state- 
level VAT, known by its initials in Portuguese as ICMS (Im posto Sobre 
Circulagao de M ercadorias e Servitos), is an origin-based consum ption tax 
that falls on m anufacturing goods and some services with different rates for 
different goods in intra-state transactions and either o f two rates used for 
inter-state transactions (a lower rate for exports to  less-developed states). 
The tax on interstate sales is fully creditable at the expense o f  the im port­
ing state. The ICM S is a complex system that so far has not worked well.37 
The introduction o f a functional VAT in India has been complicated by 
constitutional provisions regarding the taxation o f goods and  services at 
the federal and state levels.38
What type of VAT would be desirable at the sub-national level? There is 
now wide consensus that the preferable form o f a sub-national VAT is a
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destination-based (as opposed to an origin-based) tax, not only because it 
relates more directly to the benefit principle, but because it is less likely to 
distort the location o f  economic activity and because it does not lend itself 
to undesirable practices, such as transfer pricing manipulations.39 Using the 
destination principle has two im portant implications (McLure, 2006). First, 
the sub-national jurisdiction o f destination gets the revenues. Second, the 
same final rate of tax applies to consumption o f a given commodity in the 
sub-national jurisdiction of destination regardless of where it is produced. 
Other desirable features o f a sub-national VAT besides being destination- 
based include some discretion to set rates, similar compliance requirements 
for intra- and inter-jurisdiction trades, and proper collection incentives.
There are several approaches to implementing a destination-based sub­
national VAT. The m ost immediate one, as practiced by national govern­
ments in the case o f  international trade, is border tax adjustments. 
However, it is clear that this approach is neither feasible nor desirable for 
internal trade am ong sub-national jurisdictions. The second approach is a 
clearing-house arrangem ent. Here all sales (intra- and inter-jurisdiction) 
are treated the same and registered im porters in other jurisdictions can 
reclaim a credit from their own authorities for taxed inputs; periodically all 
jurisdictions settle up and  clear net claims. The clearing-house arrangem ent 
can be cumbersome but it is actually practiced in Israel and the West Bank 
and G aza Strip. The main problem with the clearing-house arrangem ent is 
that there are no incentives within the system to verify that the claims 
for refunds are legitimate. The third is the zero-rating/deferred payment 
approach; here the sales to  registered taxpayers in other states are zero­
rated and  the tax on im ports is deferred until the im porter pays tax but, at 
the same time, he also gets the credit for the tax on imports. This is the basic 
mechanism used under the QST and it is also the ‘interim ’ solution that has 
been in use in the European Union for cross-member country transactions.
The essence o f the Quebec dual VAT (the provincial QST and the federal 
GST) is to handle interstate sales on a zero-rated, deferred payment basis 
(Bird and G endron, 1998). This dual VAT is administered by Quebec’s 
provincial authorities. There is, however, an im portant role played by the 
federal authorities. This tax requires a well-functioning national VAT with 
jo in t audits and a high level o f inform ation exchange to work well. For 
example, even though Quebec cannot m onitor a zero-rated export to 
another province, the norm al process o f  the federal audit serves as a check 
that Quebec VAT has not been evaded. The institutional set-up provides 
incentives for enforcement o f the provincial and federal taxes; in particu­
lar, the QST is charged on a price inclusive o f the federal G ST basis.
The administrative problem o f imposing a destination-based sub­
national VAT has attracted several recent contributions in the literature
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seeking creative solutions to  sub-national VATs. The first o f  these contri­
butions is known as the ‘com pensating VAT’ or CVAT, first proposed by 
Varsano (1995, 1999) for Brazil and expanded by M cLure (2000b). The 
CVAT preserves the zero rating o f  sales between the sub-national jurisdic­
tions but m aintains the VAT chain by instead charging a compensating 
VAT on all cross-border sales. This com pensating VAT is fully creditable to 
the importer, so that no jurisdiction would collect any net revenue from the 
tax on interstate sales to  registered traders. In addition, the adm inistration 
o f the CVAT is to be com bined into the federal VAT; that is, the CVAT 
would be paid to  the federal government and then the im porter would 
credit it against federal VAT due -  o r get a refund. A significant advantage 
o f the CVAT is that it requires a fairly low level o f administrative capacity. 
However, it has the disadvantage o f  the asymmetric treatm ent given to  the 
in-state and out-of-state buyers.
The second contribution to the implementation o f a destination-based 
sub-national VAT is the ‘viable integrated VAT' or VIVAT, initially pro­
posed by Keen and Smith (1996) as a solution for the European Union. The 
VIVAT charges a VAT tax at a com m on rate on all transactions between all 
registered traders, inside o f and outside o f  the jurisdiction, while sales to 
final consumers and non-registered traders are taxed at the rate o f the juris­
diction where the seller is located. A conspicuous advantage o f  the VIVAT 
is that it does not require the existence of a federal VAT. However, it requires 
the asymmetric treatm ent o f  registered traders and final consumers.
In summary, there are currently three viable options for a destination- 
based sub-national VAT. While the dual VAT has been working in Quebec, 
C anada, the CVAT and the VIVAT options have yet to be implemented. 
Each o f  the three options presents advantages and disadvantages in terms 
o f generally desirable traits o f a destination-based sub-national VAT. It is 
desirable, for example, that sellers do not need to identify the destination 
jurisdiction or the type o f  buyer in order to charge the tax. Or it is also 
desirable that the tax can be implemented w ithout the need for a central 
agency adm inistering the process. When these and other desirable proper­
ties are tallied, none o f the options for a sub-national VAT is inherently 
better than  the others. The choice o f  the sub-national VAT will need to be 
made according to  existing constraints and m ost desirable objectives.40
7 THE INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE WITH TAX 
ASSIGNMENTS
The international experience with revenue assignments shows great diver­
sity o f  approaches and, therefore, is not easily summarized. A useful way
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to view this international experience is along two main dimensions: first, 
the form o f legislation and effective use o f  tax autonomy; and second, the 
level o f  decentralization in tax adm inistration arrangements. According to 
these dimensions, we can identify three main types o f tax assignment 
models in the world practice.
The first is what we could call the ‘tax autonom y' model, prevalent in 
C anada and the United States. These countries exhibit revenue assignments 
with a great deal o f  tax autonom y and independent legislation, and decen­
tralized tax adm inistrations at the sub-national levels. In these two coun­
tries, the same revenue bases are generally taxed by different levels of 
government. This international model does not present harm onized tax 
bases across sub-national jurisdictions, which results in relatively higher 
taxpayer compliance costs and adm inistration costs.
The second model we could call the ‘tax sharing/transfer’ model. This is 
prevalent in a large num ber o f countries including Australia, Germany, 
Russia and Spain. This model o f revenue assignment is characterized by 
low tax autonom y and heavier reliance on tax-sharing and transfers. This 
would also offer a variety of tax adm inistration arrangem ents, mostly cen­
tralized (Australia. Russia, Spain) but also exceptionally decentralized 
(Germany).
The third model is the ‘piggyback taxes’ model, and it is prevalent in the 
Scandinavian and o ther N orthern and C entral European countries. Here a 
significant degree o f  tax autonom y is achieved through surcharges or pig­
gyback taxes on central taxes, while this autonom y comes mostly in the 
form o f determ ining a flat surcharge rate. In this model the adm inistration 
of taxes at all levels remains highly centralized.
8 SUMMARY A N D  CONCLUSIONS
Effective fiscal decentralization requires meaningful levels o f  revenue 
autonom y at the regional and local levels o f  governm ent. These confer­
ence notes review the theory and practice o f  tax assignments, seeking to 
answer the question o f  which taxes are better allocated to  sub-national 
jurisdictions.
Besides adequate revenues to fund the public expenditure needs o f sub­
national governments, what we most want from revenue assignments is 
accountability and political and fiscal responsibility for sub-national gov­
ernm ent officials. This is fundamentally achieved by granting sub-national 
governments a significant level o f tax autonomy. Achieving a good level of 
tax autonom y has many other benefits including the imposition o f a hard 
budget constraint on sub-national governments.
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However, the full financing o f  sub-national governments from au to ­
nom ous tax sources is generally not feasible. The commonly accepted com ­
promise is that sub-national governments need to raise their own funds at 
the margin and operate with hard budget constraints; this means that 
revenue-sharing and grants should represent only infra-marginal funding. 
Operationally, this translates into the golden rule for revenue assignment: 
own revenue sources should fund the expenditure needs (net o f conditional 
grants) o f  the wealthiest sub-national governments, and the revenue needs 
o f the relatively poorer sub-national government should be supplemented 
with equalization grants.
However, not all forms o f tax autonom y are equally desirable. All things 
considered, the best way to  provide sub-national governments with tax 
autonom y is to  have a closed list o f  taxes for which sub-national govern­
ments can set tax rates within some minimum and maximum values that are 
nationally legislated. G ood choices for sub-national governments include 
maximum use o f  fees and charges for excludable services under the benefit 
principle, plus a list o f well-suited taxes such as the property tax, vehicle 
taxes and piggyback personal income taxes. Recent advances also make it 
possible to  introduce a sub-national VAT in either its dual Quebec-style 
form, or under the CVAT or VIVAT forms.
The international experience clearly shows that there are no unique well- 
defined formulas for revenue assignments. While there is ample revenue au ton­
omy in N orth  America and countries in Scandinavia and in Central Europe, 
many other decentralized countries around the world rely very heavily on 
revenue-sharing and transfers to  finance sub-national governments.
This latter situation continues to  be puzzling. M ore research is needed to 
understand the political economy behind some o f the anom alies in the 
choices o f revenue assignments. In particular, it is im portant to better 
understand why the wrong revenue assignments have proved so difficult to 
change in a significant num ber o f countries and also why the little revenue 
authority  provided to sub-national governments quite often goes unused 
even though these governm ents might, at the same time, dem and more 
funding. Future research should be m ore heavily focused on the political 
economy o f  revenue assignments.
NOTES
1. This chapter is based on the notes presented at the 4th Symposium on Fiscal Federalism 
organized by IEB. at the University o f Barcelona in May 2006. Some parts o f this 
chapter draw on joint work with Andrey Timofeev and I am grateful for his input. I 
would like to express my gratitude to Nuria Bosch and Jose Maria Duran for the invita­
tion to the IEB, 2006 conference.
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2. See, for example, Martinez-Vazquez, McLure and Vaillancourt (2006).
3. See Burki, Perry and Dillinger (1999) for the experience of some Latin American coun­
tries.
4. See Bahl and Linn (1992). Prior knowledge o f expenditure assignments can also help to 
better design revenue assignments because different services may call for different forms 
of financing. Some services (public utilities, bus transportation) can be financed by user 
charges while other services characterized by significant externalities, should be financed 
from region-wide taxes and intergovernmental transfers.
5. See McLure (1998) and Bird (2000).
6. See McLure (2001) for the role o f history in revenue assignments.
7. A number of recent studies (e.g., Ter-Minassian, 1997; Ebel and Yilmaz. 2002) suggest 
that outcomes o f decentralized spending depend on the form of financing used for these 
expenditures, with a crucial aspect being the extent o f control that local governments can 
exercise over the sources of their revenue.
8. A hard budget constraint implies that those local governments given autonomy will be 
asked to balance their budgets without recourse to any end-of-year assistance from the 
central government and a  ciear- understanding that there will be ‘no bailout’ at year-end 
or in the case o f debt default. See Rodden, Eskel and Litvack (2003).
9. Traditionally it has been thought that greater sub-national revenue autonomy may com­
promise the ability o f the center to implement stabilization policies; in reality, the reverse 
seems to happen. It could be that greater sub-national revenue autonomy leads to more 
conservative budget policies and lower deficits at all levels of government. See Martinez- 
Vazquez and McNab (2006).
10. This argument is made very clearly in McLure (1998).
11. See Bird and Ebel (2007) on the possibilities and problems with asymmetric fiscal feder­
alism.
12. See Musgrave(1983); Boadway (1997); Norregard (1997); McLure (1998 and 2000a) and 
Bird (2000).
13. The international experience shows that providing sub-national governments with 
freedom to select their own taxes (the open-list approach) can easily backfire when sub­
national governments introduce highly inefficient (distortionary) forms of taxation. A 
recent example is provided by Indonesia, which adopted an open-list approach in the 
2001 decentralization reform. See Aim. Martinez-Vazquez and Indrawati (2004).
14. See Dahlby and Wilson (1996, 2003); Keen (1998) and Boadway, Marchand and 
Vigneault (1998).
15. See. for example. Flowers (1988); Dahlby (1996); Boadway et al. (1998) and Keen (1998).
16. The ability to change either base o r rate opens up the possibility o f fiscal competition 
am ong sub-national governments fWilson, 1999). Inter-jurisdictional fiscal competi­
tion can have both good aspects, such as offering choices to taxpayers and keeping 
public officials more accountable, and also bad aspects, such as a ‘run to the bottom ’ 
type o f  behavior actually taking place in countries with a significant degree o f sub­
national tax autonomy. In addition, the ability to change tax base o r rate can give rise 
to ‘horizontal’ fiscal externalities, whereby the policies o f one jurisdiction (for example, 
raising tax rates) can have an effect on the tax bases o f other jurisdictions (raising their 
tax bases related to mobile taxpayers). Intergovernmental grants and o ther policies can 
be implemented by the central government to  correct horizontal fiscal externalities. 
See, for example, A m ott and Grieson (1981); Gordon (1983) and Wildasin (1983, 
1989).
17. See Martinez-Vazquez and Timofeev (2005).
18. See, for example, Martinez-Vazquez and Boex (2001) and Martinez-Vazquez, Timofeev 
and Boex (2006).
19. The regional governments may keep the centrally designed tax schedule, in which case 
they will receive 33 per cent o f the total tax take, or they may increase or reduce the rates 
but with the requirement that the rate schedule be a progressive tax with the same 
number o f  brackets as in the central government's income tax. In addition, the regional 
governments may also establish their own tax credits, which would only affect their
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differential tax take. In practice, regional governments have changed tax credits and not 
the tax rate schedule. See Lopez-Laborda, Martinez-Vazquez and Monasterio (2007).
20. Otherwise, when decisions on economic stabilization and income distribution are left to 
the local governments, wrong incentives and conflicts may arise, and policies may be 
ineffective and unsustainable.
21. See, for example, McLure (1998).
22. However, despite the wide agreement on the advantages o f the property tax as a  sub­
national tax. sub-national governments in developing and transitional countries make 
relatively little use o f the property tax. On average, transitional and developing countries 
raise property tax revenues that are equivalent to only about 0.6 percent o f GDP. See 
Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez (2007) for an investigation of this puzzle.
23. The balance between the services received by property owners and the property taxes 
they pay on their real estate typically can be capitalized into property values. That is, 
property taxes do not have to reduce the market value of dwellings if the general per­
ception is that the quality o f services provided by the local government is good.
24. See Bahl and Linn (1992) and Sennoga, Sjoquist and Wallace (2007).
25. O f course, low interest may also reflect the perception that the property tax is complex 
and has low revenue potential vis-a-vis its associated political costs, although there are 
exceptions (for example. China, Indonesia and Jamaica).
26. Being ‘house rich and income poor’can be a problem for elderly people. Some countries 
use special exemption schemes ('homestead exemptions’ or ‘circuit breakers’) to increase 
equity in the implementation o f property taxes.
27. For international experience with the property tax see Bird and Slack (2004) and Bahl 
and Martinez-Vazquez (2007).
28. See, for example, McLure (1996) and Bahl and Tumennasan (2004).
29. See Keen (2003). The 1RAP (Imposta Regionale sulle Activita Produttive) is payable by 
businesses on the amount their sales exceed the sum of their material purchases and 
depreciation. This is an origin-based income-type (no full deduction for investment) 
VAT administered by the subtraction method centrally. Regions have discretion on rates. 
Although it has many good features o f a benefit tax, it has proven to be quite unpopu­
lar with taxpayers.
30. For example, in the Netherlands, provinces impose a surcharge on the m otor vehicle tax 
levied by the central government. Provinces are free to set the rate o f the surcharge, 
subject to a ceiling imposed by the central government.
31. Generally speaking, a local income tax should be levied at the place o f residence because 
it is there where most taxpayers consume sub-national government services. However, 
because o f administrative convenience, sub-national piggyback taxes are often withheld 
at source at the place o f work by employees. However, it is quite feasible to distribute the 
funds according to where workers reside.
32. Other forms o f tax autonom y are practiced, such as the ability to modify the base o f 
the tax by providing more or less deductions, exemptions and so on.
33. Revenue-sharing on a derivation basis for the VAT also means that, as in the case for the 
sharing of corporate income taxes, the tax tends to be paid according to the place of reg­
istration or the location o f the headquarters o f business firms.
34. In the case o f Canada’s harmonized sales tax for the Maritime Provinces, all three 
provinces have a uniform rate that piggybacks on the federal VAT.
35. See Fox and Luna (2003) for a discussion o f the issues.
36. See Bird and Gendron (1998).
37. See Varsano (1995, 1999).
38. See Bahl et al. (2005).
39. A destination-based VAT is a tax on consumption in the taxing jurisdiction (it taxes 
imports but not exports), while an origin-based tax is a tax on production in the taxing 
jurisdiction (it taxes exports but not imports).
40. See Bird and Gendron (2000); Keen (2000), Keen and Smith (2000) and McLure (2006) 
for an animated discussion o f the advantages and disadvantages o f the dual VAT. CVAT 
and VIVAT.
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